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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
OHVJ LL~J l1JVgRSHED alld J1JARL

HK:\ll\IER'r,
Plai11fifj's a11d RrspoJ1de11ts,

)

-\'S.-

H. BbJHRY and l\HRIAl\I B. BERRY, (
.\fARY J1JLLEN RAY dha J\IARY JjjL- \
L1'JN'S DR~JSS SHOP arnl ROBER'l'
KU .\IP dim RAY'S BAH BER SHOP,
Drfe1111rmts,
and

J())'

Case No.
10889

l'HILLTP CONLEY dba HICKORY PIT,
Defe11da11t aj/(l Appclla11t.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
NATURE OF THJ<J CASE
The purpose of this case is to determine wh0ther or
not a fiv0-year written lease b0tween a contract purl'haspr as lessor and his lessee is binding upon the contl'nd sdlc>r after the contract purchaser's interest in the
rral estate has hec>n terminated b~· a Court decr0e.
DIRPOSTTIO~

TN THE

LOWER

COURT

The District Court by dc>eree datPcl Jmrnar~- 13, 1961,
!l'rmiuntPd the intPrest of the contract purchasers, .Joy
l

R. Berry, et ux, and 011 l\fareh 30, 1967, hy Summar)·
Judgment determined that a lease between the eoutrart
purchaser and a lessee was not binding upon the ron.
tract seller and terminated the lessee> 's right to posseRsion. The Appeal involves only the Judgm<:>nt of Marrh
30, 1967.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Appellant seeks to reverse the .Judgment
of the District Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 20, 1965, the Plaintiff-Respondents, hereinafter ref erred to as Evershed, owned eertain real c;;tate in Murray, Utah, and sold sueh real estate to .To)·
R. Berry, (>t ux, under the terms of a Real Estate Contract (Exhibit P-1).
On October 20, 1965, the contract, which contained a
provision to the effect that no assignment or transfer of
an interest in the property would be valid unless made
with the written consent of Evershed, the seller, was
recorded in the County Recorder's Office of Salt Lake
County, Utah (Exhibit P-1).
On July 2, 1966, Joy R. Berry entered into a written
five-year lease agreement with the Defendant-Appellant,
Phillip Conley, hereinafter referred to as Conley, eoYcring a part only of the premises being purchase<l frorn
Evershed ( R-27).
Evershed had no knowledge of the terms or rouclitions of the lease (R-44).

2

'l'hP contract purchasers, .Joy R. Berry, et nx, defaul!('rl and their interest in a!l(l to the real estate and
possession thereof was terminated (Findings of Fact,
1
( onclusions
of Law and Judgment, R-20-21, 22, 23
and 2-1-).

On December 14th and 15th, 1966, Conley and Berry
wrr0 served with the Complaint and Summons (R-16
a 1111 18).
Tlwre arc no writings or memoranda of any agreeml'nt between Evershed and Conley. (R-31, 44 and 45.)
ARGUMENT
Conley's only contention is that he has a valid arnl
rxisting five-year lease dated July 2, 1966. (R-25 and
Appellant's Brief page 4)

It is admitted that the lease is Yalid as between Conk·»-1essee and Berry-lessor, as the parties thereto.
'l'he onl~· question to bP determined is whether the
l!·ase is binding upon Evrrshed who \ms not a party
tlJPreto.
The real estate contract was placed of record \\·ith
t!Jp Count~- Recorder (Exhibit P-1) and thereby const ructin' notice was given to all persons that no interest
i11 the property conld he obtained without the written
r·o11,.;011t of F,,·ershed.

:~

POINT 1
LESSEE'S INTERES'l' TERl\IIN ATED WHEX
HIS LESSOR'S INTEREST WAS TERMINATED.

It is fundamental that a lessee obtains 110 greater
rights in the leased premises than those of the lessor.
"93. TERMINATION OF LANDLORD'S ESTATE . . . As
a general rule a lesse0 is terminated hy the expiration of the lessor's estate, and no 11otire, wriitrn
or otherwise, is necessary to bring about surh
termination .... '' 51 CJS, Sec. 93.
And, as stated by Justice Field of the U. S. Snprernr
Court, in the case of Deseret 8alt Company v. Tarpr11.
142 U.S. 241, 35 Law Edition 199 (Appeal from Utah
Territon' Court).
'' ... The lessee ran, of course, as agai118t a
stranger have no greater right of possession than
his lessor ... '' Page 244.
Since the lessor's interests (Berry, et ux) were terminated by a judicial derrec which is final and from
which there is no appeal, it is necessary for the les~ee
(Conley) to offer material facts tending to prove alleg-ntions setting forth an agreement between Evershed aJlll
Conley.
POINT 2
A FIVE-YEAR LEASE IS NOT VALID
AGAINST THE PROPERTY OWNER UNLESS IT IS BASED ON WRITTEN MEMORANDUM SIGNED BY THE PROPJ@TY
OWNER.
4

Conley makes no claim as to the existence of any
\\Titings or memoranda reflecting an agT0ement hetw0en
Conley a11il Evers!Jed. Conley's only claim as to any
eonnrsation with En~rshed refers to a conversation
orruning after Conley had heen ser\'ed with a Complaint
],~, En'rshl'd naming Conle>' as a Defendant and seeking
a Court adjudication terminating all adverse interP8ts
in the rl'al <'state (R-14, R-31).
Fnder the Statute of Frauds, no ll'ase or contract
for an intel'est in land is \'alid unless it i8 in writing and
>11hscrilwc1 hy the Lessor.
'' 25-5-3. LEASES AND CONTRACTS FOR INTERESTS IN
LANDS. Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of any
lan<ls, or an>' intf•rest in lands, shall be void unless
the contract or some note or memorandum thereof,
is in writing subscribed by the party by whom
the lease or sale is to he ma<le, or by his lawful
agPnt thereunto authorized in writing." (Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.) (Statute of
Frauds.)
Further all agreements which by their terms cannot
lie pel'forml'd within one year are void unless in writing
H1hscrihed hy thr party

to be charged.

"25-5-1. CERTAIN AGREEMENTS Vorn UNLESS WRITTEN A ND SUBSCRIBED - In the following cases ever:v agreement shall bl' \'oid unless such agreement or some note or memorandum thereof, is in
writing subscribed by the party to be charged
therewith:
(1) Every agreement that by its terms is not
to he pl'rfol'med within one year from the making
5

thereof . . . " (Utah Code Annotated, 1933,
amended.) (Sta tnte of Frauds.)

11,

A parol lease of property for more than one year i.'
of no force and effect whatever aR inclicatNl in the la11rlmark case of Utah 07)firal Company, •. Krith, Fehrnar;23, 1899, 18 U. 464, 56 P. 155.
" . . . The alleged lease. being hy parol for two
·was void, under the statute of frauds, and
therefore had no force or effect whatever. It
passed no leasehold estate. The relation of landlord and tenant could not he creat0d by, or rontimwd under it . . . " Page 157.
~rears,

Conley makes no claim that the terms and conclitiom
of a lease ag-rrement were known to Evershed prior to
the time that the lease was filed as an exhil1it to an affidavit in this action, or that the terms and conditions of
a lease were discussed.

It is axiomatic that until the parties ha-\·e discnssrd
and agreed upon the terms there cannot he an pnforceahle contract. This rule of law is espoused in Campbell
v. Nelson, April, 1942, 102 Utah 78, 125 Pac. 2d 413:
" ... 'Every contract for the leasing· for a longrr
period than· one year, or for the sale~ of any lands.
or any interests in lands, shall be void unless tl1r
contract, or some note or memorandum thereof.
is in writing subscribed by the party by whom the
10ase or sale is to he made, or hy his lawfnl agPnt
therennto authorize<l in writing.'
"The terms of the contract in the prcsrnt
case "·ere indefinite. An oral contract for thr
purchase of real propert~· muRt he suffiricntl:r
6

<1rfi11ite and rertain so that it can he enforced bv
the court. Until the parties have agreed as to th.e
terms there is not an enforceable contract in fact,
and partial performance cannot make up for the
ck•ficiency in the nnderstandilng between the parties ... " Page 415.
The rules set forth in the above cases were reviewed
and reaffirmed in the casP of Rirdzell v. Utah Oil Refini11g ro., April, 1952, 121 U. 412, 242 P. 2nd 578, page 580.
'' ... In an oral contract to execute a lease for a
period longer than one year, the amount of the
rPnt is clearly one of the essential terms which
must appear in a memorandum . . . 'It may be
stated as settled law that a memorandum of
agreement for a lease which is required to be in
writing, in order to satisfy the statute of frauds,
must contain all the essential and material parts
of the lease which is to be executed thereafter according to its terms, and particularly must contain three essentials in order to (sic) its validity
under the statute of frauds. These are: First, a
definite agreement as to the extent and boundary
of the property to be leased; second, a definite
and agreed term; and third, a definite and agreed
rental and the time and manner of its payment ... '"

I

I
i

\
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POINT 3
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER FOR
THERE ARE NO CONTESTED ISSUES OF
FACT THAT WOULD HAVE A MATERIAL
BEARING ON THIS CASE.
The Plaintiff, Evershed, agrees with the law affectSummary Judgments as cited by the Defendant Conley. Evrrshed does not agree that those certain items
ing

7

listed in thr paragTaphs lettered "a" t hrnng·h "l'" i11
C'onlp:-'s Brirf <'Onstitute materinl, admissible fads. 'l'li1·
elnims rontained in thr ldtered paragrnphs an• h1•r1·aftc>r eonsicl0rr(l in idrntieall:--lrttPn•d pnragTaphs.
a. It rerp1ires thP applieatio11 of the law to thP fad,
to detrrmine wht>thrr or not a n1licl lt>asP Pxistr1l lwhrP1·11
Conlr>- and Enrshc•d. It is admittP<l that a Yalicl le:t;,1·
PxistPcl brtwPPn the signatoriPs of that leasr to-wit:
Bt>rr>·· Lessor, aml Conle:-, Lt>ssee. 1'ht> elaim that tlir
fh-r-:·ear \\Tittrn leasr hehYPPn C'onlr:- arnl Beny hiniJ,
E\·ershe<l is a quest ion of la"· arn1 thr fads prPsc•ntr·il
to support thL• samr must he aclmissihh· nrnkr th<' ;;t:it11l1
of framls. Xo snch aclmissihlr matc•rial facts lrnn-

h<'!'li

Jll'O]lOSeCT !
h. It is claimed that Ewrsht>cl ratifircl thr Co11l

1

·\--

Brrn- lt>ase h>· arcc•pting Conlr:· 011 the propc rf>·· Till'
occ11pm1e:· of tlw pro11erty hy Con]p>· is aclmittP<l :1~ :m·
the cireumstanet>s mi<lt>r which lw aeq11ir0d possPssi011.
1'h0 clt>tPrmination as to whrtl10r s11eh oceupancy c011,li1

t11tt>d ratification or acloption of tlH· Co11l0:·-Rprr\· lf'<l'''
h:· E\·prshecl is n question of law all<l not a q11Pstio1

1

of fad.
The Court's att0ntion is again <lrnw11 to thr fact fh:1t
t ]ip 1rrms a 11cl co11di tions of the Bc•rry-Con le:· lease " 1·n·
not known to EYrrshecl at thr t irne possrssion "·as olit:ii11rd l):· C011l0:·.

c. Tn the rmragTaph numht•l'(•tl "c" of Conlc·:-"s Jiril'i'.
it is elaimecl that C01il0:· is n !Prnrnt from

8

Yl'<H

to n:ii.

11hid1 claim is completely colltrary to Conle~''s claim
in his Answer (R-25) or his Brief in the second para~rilph of Point 1 on page 4, wherein he claims a
tin'-)·ear written lease. There is no offer to prove a year
tn )'rar lPase in either the pleadings or the Affidavit of
the D0fendant, Conley. This contention is first made in
(]w f.lupreme Court of the Atate of Utah.

d. Since an act does not constitute a written memorandum signed by the Lessor, the acts of the Plaintiff
:ire wholly immaterial. Nevertheless, such acts as may
he set forth by Conley are admitted by Evershed and the
tlispute is as to the legal consequence of these acts.
· e. Conley claims that the suit was not based on his
llcfanlt. This claim is true. The suit is based on Ever~hcrl 's right to possession of the property as owner and
<ls a result of Berry's default in the performance of the
conditions of the Real Estate Purchase Contract.
Although the law cited by Conley in relation to Summary Judgment is correct the Summary Judgment in this
rase should he sustained for there is no material fact
allrged or proposed ·which ·would affect the application of
the legal principles that is not admitted.
Conley could have determined whether his lease
liouncl Evershed by submitting such lease to Evershed
hefore its execution, and asking Evershed 's acceptance
thereof or subordination thereto and his improvidence
'l1oulcl not result in damage to Evershed who was not a
party to the transaction.
9

Co11le.'· may well han" a claim for br<'ach of hi:-; rigl1t
of pos:-;ession against Reny as lessor, hut thPr0 is 110
n•ason to ,·isit upo11 the owner:-; of the prnperty the lial iii i ties and damag0s r0sulting from t Ju• lessor':-; fa ihm·
to maintnin his purchase contract or tl1<' les:-;pe ':-; failnn·
to obtain co11:-;011t to the l0asc from the mn1ns.

CONCLUSION
All rights of lessor, Berry, were terminated h)· Court
decr0e; and, therefore, it is necessary for Conle.'', the
Appellant, to allege a relationship betwee11 001iley n11d
En,rsh0cl. TlH•re are no such allegations.
Si11ce a lease for a pPriod i11 excNrn of om' year j,;
Yoid unless supported h.'· 'uittPn nwmoranda signe(l h>the part.'· he eharged, it is incumhPnt upon Conle.'· to
claim the existence of such memoranda and hc> Jrn;.; failed
to make such claim.
There is no issue of faet that "·ould hm·e a material bearing on this case. Tlw Di,.;trirt Court was ('01'rrct in granting Juc1gnwnt and sneh Judgment should lw
sustained.
Rrspertfull:· submitted,
BIELE, .TONES & MURPHY
117 East 4th South Strec't
.lt Lakr Ci h-, Utah
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